I agree that it would be better if this publication would stick with the argument about the reality and importance of race, not the more emotional/political/moral stuff concerning discrimination, in-group favoritism and so on.

I wish you commented before I made edits in line with MH's position. They are in red. Let me know what you both think. I will edit later.

Since you have merged it, I can read the whole thing thru again if you want.

Yes, could you. But first let me post an updated version. In a couple of days.

I would like to rewrite parts of 6. Could you identify the arguments most in need of improving. I don't want to defend adaptive utilitarianism and justify biased discrimination -- it's out of place here. I have thought about it myself, though. I know what you mean. This topic deserves a separate paper.

I only said this : do what you want. I don't want to give my approval conditional on what you write in section 6. That's not the most important thing. But if you want my input, I would say that the key element here is the fact ethnic kinship is just an extension of family kinship and that regardless of the acceptance of biological races, people will continue to practice nepotism for the same reason (which has originally nothing to do with races). Generally, you said that although I would approach the matter in a very different way. The only thing that makes no sense to me is this passage :

But, like (preference) utilitarianism, this type of adaptive ethics, does not currently have much ethical currency. It does not then put us in a situation to well evaluate viable consequentialist arguments against our cosmopolitan concept of race.

Salter explained why his adaptive utilitarianism does not involve injustice. So, your argument doesn't make sense. Consequentialist arguments certainly don't take into account the difference between proximate and ultimate interests. Salter has strongly insisted on that (see pp. 311-312 of his book).

To be honest, there are more urgent matters. Such as the abstract. It has improved, yet I don't think it's satisfying. If the article is short, maybe. But most people would hesitate before deciding to read the entire article. Because it's too long. That's why the abstract needs to be more exciting. Think about this passage :

This concept of race is compared and contrasted with other ones presented in the philosophical literature. The concept is then situated in the developed biological onto-epistemology, and it is explained why this concept is not radically different from those race concepts first developed in the 18th century. Next, the concept is discussed in relation to anthropological discourse. Traditional human racial classifications are discussed in detail and are defended from common criticisms.

First sentence : what "other ones" ? and in what way it helps to defend or understand your defense of the race concept ?
Second sentence : in what way it helps to defend your argument ?
Third sentence : same.
Fourth sentence : what common criticisms ?

The other sentences also have the same problem. I don't believe you can convince someone to read 150-160 pages with an abstract such as "Finally, the race concept is defended from various criticisms. First, logical and empirical critiques are dissected.". It has no flavour. You need something spicy. You have to pique their curiosity. So, I will appreciate if you feel like rewriting the abstract entirely. It will be a sad time if you realize that people don't want to read it because it's too long.

Here's my suggestion. Put your best arguments in the spotlight. You can say explicitly that the concepts developed in the 18th century were not essentialistic concepts (be it species realist's species or character essentialism) and thus criticisms arguing about that missed the point (you can put in parentheses "section 3"). You can say also that genetic discontinuity is a requirement for species, not races (you can put in parentheses "section 5"). You can also say that the Lewontin's argument doesn't work because 15% is already a meaningful effect size and that it even ignores intra-individual variations. And that races are generally not treated as taxonomic categories (e.g., sections 1 and 5), that human characters don't vary independently unlike what people such as Diamond (1994) would have it but instead are correlated, that there is no need of unique answer to the question of how many races there are. etc... etc... If you do that, I'm certain that the average reader will become much more interested in what you have to say. Ideally, your abstract should send the following message "I know all your arguments: here's the list [bla bla bla...]. And they are all wrong".

I rewrote the abstract (not in red) and a number of other passages throughout the piece (in red). Please check over. I found that I used "criteria" (pl.) and criterion interchangeably.

I rewrote the abstract (not in red) and a number of other passages throughout the piece (in red). Please check over. I found that I used "criteria" (pl.) and criterion interchangeably.

Note that only the doc file was updated for the abstract.

I rewrote the abstract (not in red) and a number of other passages throughout the piece (in red). Please check over. I found that I used "criteria" (pl.) and criterion interchangeably.

Note that only the doc file was updated for the abstract.

The pdf has been updated.

I have read the passages in red, and I see no problems. I accept the publication.

I will make public the list of reviewer requests I have sent out. I am primarily emailing researchers who have written about the biological concept.

Adam Hochman -- pending (sent 4/16)

Michael O. Hardimon -- pending (sent 4/14)

Jeremy Pierce -- No reply (sent 4/08)

Michael Levin -- Accepted, then no reply after (sent 3/13)

Michael Woodley -- Replied, noted he liked it, but said to publish elsewhere (sent 3/13)

Neven Sesardic -- Replied, busy (3/11)

You only reference Hochman (2013) in your bibliography. Yet, he published another paper "Unnaturalised Racial Naturalism" in 2014, which covers most your arguments, easily debunking them.

"The problem with weak versions of racial naturalism is that they do not contrast with anti-realism about biological race." (Hochman, 2014)

Thanks for the comments. I read the paper, it was a reply to Spencer (2014). (I attached it for readers who lack access.) In email, I commented to Spencer about it; specifically the nonsense about subspecies. I did not discuss the paper because it seemed to provide no new arguments and it touched upon nothing which I did not already address. (I also, for example, didn't discuss Ron Mallon's arguments, since a rebuttal of them was contained in my various discussions.) Hochman (2014) did motivate me to extensively discuss and to clarify the semantics of "subspecies" and to discuss what in post-Darwinian biology "natural" and "real" groups are conceived of as.

This is really the main problem with "Nature of Race", you are offering a re-definition or new theory of race which is weak compared to the traditional concept and as Hochman goes on to note the result is that:

"When race naturalists weaken their position they end up agreeing with their opponents about human biology, and defending a trivialised definition of race." (Hochman, 2014).

It sounds like you did not bother to read through the paper. Try sections II-A/B/C and sections III-B/C. I discussed historic race concepts and showed the similarity between them and contemporaneous ones. I also showed that the idea that race was historically thought of in a "strong" realist (e.g., intrinsic essentialist or species realist-like) manner is a myth.

If you want to call (intraspecific) races as natural divisions weak, you can. But they were never thought of more strongly.

Yes, II-A/B/C: Linnaeus, Buffon, Kant, Blumenbach etc., all actually support Hochman's 'strong' criteria for race, which you oddly have a problem with. Here's for example Buffon quoted on page 29 in II/A:

"[T]hese varieties became afterwards specific, because they were rendered more general, more strongly marked,"

In footnotes:

"Buffon tells us that they “come from the same stem and preserve until today the characteristics of their race without great variation"

edited.

If you read my article in full, you must not have thought it over well.

First, as I noted numerous times, Linnaeus did not think in terms of race. He thought in terms of varieties. I said, for example:

Under this framework, individuals of a species were essentially the same; if reared in the same environment, they would have the same form. Since intraspecific variation was the product of the environment, there was no distinction between the many sorts of variation. The differences between Ethiopian Albinos and Black Ethiopians, between White Europeans and Black Ethiopians, between sun-tanned Europeans and untanned ones were of the same kind: variety.

Buffon, Kant, and the later Blumenbach did think in terms of race, where races were "constant varieties" or groups defined by constantly transmitted hereditary particularities (or patterns of them), and were defined, on the one hand, in contrast to species (which would have been homogeneous by nature) and, on the other hand, inconstant varieties, which represented individual variations (e.g., blonds and brunettes, albinos versus non-albinos), and which we would now call polymorphs or intrapopulation variants. Thus early race concepts necessarily entailed intrapopulation heterogeneity.

If you want, I could cite relevant passages (from Buffon, Kant, and Blumenbach). I did indirectly discuss this topic, though, for example:

"As another example, Dobzhansky (1970), after approvingly quoting Immanuel Kant on the matter, states: “A race is a Mendelian population, not a single genotype; it consists of individuals who differ genetically among themselves”.

"This pattern repeats itself with other racial theorists. For example, in "On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy (1788)", Kant, a monogenist like other well-known racial theorists, distinguished between "races" and "varieties" as he defined them. By his understanding, varieties characterized groups of individuals whose trait differences were failingly hereditary; Kant gave the example of blonds and brunettes. Races, on the other hand, characterized intraspecific groups whose trait differences were unfailingly hereditary. Regarding the latter, Kant gave the example of skin color in context to gypsies and old Europeans. He notes: "Now we possess a decisive example of the latter in the Indian skin color of a small people that has been propagating itself from some centuries in our Northern countries, namely the gypsies... For they beget unfailingly half-breed children with our old natives, to which law the race of the whites is not subject with regards to any characteristic varieties." He went onto distinguish thusly between races and species."

"As such, in, "On the Natural Varieties of Mankind”, he tells us that “one or two [characters] alone are not sufficient” to delineate varieties and that we “must take several joined together”. Blumenbach’s position did not change in this regards when he adopted Kant’s race concept, a concept which Blumenbach cited in the fifth – or 1797 – edition of his “Handbook of Natural History”. As such, in “Contributions to Natural History (1806)”, in the subsection “Division of Man into Five Principle Races”, he tells us that there is “not a single one of the bodily differences in any one variety of man, which does not run into some of the others”. Speaking of Africans, he states that he is “acquainted with no single distinctive bodily character which is at once peculiar to the Negro, and which cannot be found to exist in many other distant nations”. Giving examples to make his point, he writes that the color of Africans can be found in New Guineans and that “curly hair is well known not to be common to all Negros”. Blumenbach’s groups, whether characterizes as varieties or as races, were quite unlike the entities discussed by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy."

Since I spent so much time explaining the inconstant variety, race, species distinction, I didn't think it was necessary to spell out that race contra inconstant varieties entailed that races were not homogeneous. [To be clearer: If races were homogeneous there could be no inconstant varieties -- i.e., intrapopulation variants -- which they were defined in contrast to.]

Since I spent so much time explaining the inconstant variety, race, species distinction, I didn't think it was necessary to spell out that race contra inconstant varieties entailed that races were not homogeneous. [To be clearer: If races were homogeneous there could be no inconstant varieties -- i.e., intrapopulation variants -- which they were defined in contrast to.]

Meng Hu,

In light of Krom's comments, I (probably unnecessarily) added to section V-G:

"V-G. No-True-Race Arguments

...

3. Races were classically understood to be homogeneous groupings.

A number of critics of the race concept have implied that races were historically conceptualized as homogeneous groups. Thus, many members of the AAA reject the race concept - but oddly not the species concept - on the grounds that there are no genetically homogeneous populations. As discussed in section II, in the Linnaean paradigm, species were thought to be homogeneous in nature. Races were contrasted with these, on the one hand, and with inconstant varieties, on the other. Races could not have been thought to be homogeneous in characters, since if they were, inconstant varieties and individual variations, which races were understood in contrast to, could not exist."

If you don't set a threshold of genetic/phenotypic differentiation, then race is meaningless. This was Dobzhansky's problem when he re-defined race as: "populations of a species which differ in the frequencies of one or more genetic variants, gene alleles, or chromosomal structures...You appear to be saying this threshold has to be low (which at least is better than Dobzhansky who set virtually none), while Hochman is saying it has to be high.

Of course, I explained this. Race is situated between individual variations and species. It describes a level of genealogical entwinement. For example, all descendants of Confucius/Charlemagne and blonds/brunets do not constitute races. But if the groups linebred enough -- but no so much to speciate -- they would. This is how the concept was understood. As I spelled out, race describes genealogical or genomic divisions. This was implied by Dobzhansky (1970). As noted:

"As another example, Dobzhansky (1970), after approvingly quoting Immanuel Kant on the matter, states: “A race is a Mendelian population, not a single genotype; it consists of individuals who differ genetically among themselves”. Later, after citing Boyd (1950) , he notes that this “is not to deny that a racial classification should ideally take cognizance of all genetically variable traits, oligogenic as well as polygenic”. He does not, along with many other population geneticists, explicitly state that races are natural divisions, but if races are populations – not forms or morphs – which differ genetically, and if classifications are based on all genetically variable traits, then races must be natural divisions."

Clearly Hochman is right because we already have clines and populations/gamodemes (as units or tools of study) that capture low, to moderate levels of biological variation in humans.

But I discussed this all in section II.

populations: II-D. What the Core Biological Race Concept Does Not represent
clines: II-E. Races, Clines, Clusters?
demes: (end of) II-C. Biological Race

None of these describe natural or genealogical divisions. What term do you offer to describe intraspecific divisions where individuals are arranged by overall genealogical or genomic similarity?

Those "intrapopulation variants" were added in the early 20th century. The two previous centuries had no "Alpines", "Mediterraneans" and "Nordics" for example in the "Caucasian" (where for example are those in Blumenbach?).

You conflate issues.

(1) Were races thought to be homogeneous groups? I discussed Blumenbach's, Kant's, and Buffon's understanding in detail. They clearly did not understand intraspecific race this way. If you think that others did, provide some examples. If you can't find ones regarding humans, you can cite, for example, the opinions of of botanists.

(2) Were different levels of races recognized. I discussed this e.g.,

"Much earlier, Buffon, for example, wrote of the “White race”, of the “European race” nested within this, and of groups as small as the “Tartar race”. Kant (1777) distinguished his base races from derivative ones: "I believe <we> can derive all of the remaining, heritable characters of peoples from these four races either as mixed or incipient or degenerating races… The way in which the remaining, imperfect races can be derived from these also helps explain why the <previously> named <races> are to be regarded as base races.""

(3) Did racial classifications go all the way down? I discussed this also:

"Buffon categorized groups similarly; groups are “races” only when character differences are constant enough (Doron, 2011). Thus, groups which Dobzhansky (1946) would have called “races”, Buffon would have called “nations”. Some of this difference of opinion may be preferential. As we noted in section II-G, some employ definitions which are narrow relative to our general biological race concept e.g., Vogel and Motulsky (1986); Sarich and Miele (2004); Pearson (2002). This is why we distinguish between a general concept and narrow concepts a la De Queiroz (1998) and Wilkins (2010) with regards to species. We suspect that there is also an epistemic issue – that Buffon and others did not recognize that one could (e.g., using molecular character) group much further down. His nations, we suspect, were seen as something between varieties (which did not allow for a genealogical classification) and races (which did). Whether or not this was true for Buffon, it definitely was for Kant, as he was quite explicit on the issue.

It became clear in the 20th century that one could differentiate populations all the way down to the local level. Given this situation, one could define “the” race concept such to include all intraspecific natural divisions (for example: Hartl and Clark, 1997) or to include only those that differ “enough” (where “enough” denotes some arbitrarily chosen level of differentiation). Or one could, as we sensibly do, simply distinguish between the general concept and narrow ones – and recognize the narrowness of concepts of race which exclude less differentiated divisions. Our argument for why the “general concept” should be more inclusive would run along the lines of Hochman’s (2013) argument that there is no reason that “race” should describe a specific level of genetic analysis. We just draw a very different conclusion: it is (general) races all the way down – not no races at all."

To answer your question, though, for "nation" Blumenbach often used the term "gens", which translates to "race". Thus when he says:

"Each of these five principal races contain besides one or more nations which are distinguished by more or less striking structures from the rest of those of the same division. Thus Hindoos might be separated from the Caucasian; the Chinese and Japanese from the Mongolian…"

"principal" means "major" in contrast to minor races or nations or gens. Blumenbach is complex though, since early on his "varieties" are of the Linnaean sort; only after he comes under the influence of Kant do they become genealogical entities or races.

Over time it was realized there is great physical variation within the continents. Anthropologists then kept multiplying "racial types" or "subraces" until the modern evolutionary synthesis discredited typology...]Later it was established there is far more variation within the continents than between them, which is why the race concept was abandoned. Race doesn't capture enough variation, nor accurately to be considered useful to describe human biological diversity.

First, race is not a human specific concept; it never was. So showing that no human classifications cut out "good" biological races would not somehow undermine the concept. Second, regarding humans, the concept is frequently employed (IV-B. Human Biological Races and Scientific Consensus). Third, "race" was never required to "capture enough variation" -- how much variation do you think that Duchesne's races of strawberries were thought to explain? Rather, race was used to explain, as said, constant varieties, which could be characterized by minor, but constantly transmitted, differences.

Let me summarize the discussion:

You argue that races does not exist because historically race was thought to refer to homogeneous groups and because it is now recognized that such groups are no where to be found. I classify this type of argument as a No-True-Race argument. See my section V-G. My problem with it is three-fold. Firstly, it presumes that we should be faithful to historic understandings. Secondly, it is being selectively applied. Since species were actually once thought of as being homogeneous in nature and diversified by environment, your argument would refute the existence of species. But you are, for some reason, not making this case. Thirdly, as explained, intraspecific race was not originally thought of this way. Did some come to think of it as referring to groups which were largely homogenous in heritable characters? I would like to see references pertaining to the intraspecifc race concept (and not just specific classifications). I would also like to see some references pertaining to human classifications (understood as intraspecific races). Whatever the case, there was no such general understanding.

Next, you cite Hochman and imply that he makes the above argument. I don't see that he does, but I can't be sure. I did ask him to review the paper; he didn't reply Hochman, instead, seems to argue something akin to: "Duh, of course you can group individuals by pedigree and of course such genealogical relationship explains some heritable phenotypic differences. So what? There is nothing special about this?" Yes -- duh. But this "duh" was called race. And the race concept was developed in context to the Linnaean framework in which common genealogy was not seen as explaining phenotypic similarities -- rather common culture and environment was. Race then, as I repeated throughout the paper, picks out a type of biological reality.

" If we start out this way – not expecting nature to determine something she never can, but asking if our understanding reflects how she is – by inspecting nature, we can determine if our concept references something out there. We can ask, for example, if species realist species exist. In the case of race, the question would be something like: do intraspecific natural divisions describe a kind of biological variation? Were the Linnaean perspective – as characterized by, for example, Müller-Wille (2007) and Ratcliff (2007) – correct, the answer would be “No”. But an examination of nature shows that this perspective, which made no room for race as an entity in natural history, is untenable. Understood this way, the existence of biological race – that is, the fact that the concept of race picks out some type of thing in nature – is biologically determined."

" If our analysis is correct, there are no sound logical or scientific reasons for rejecting the biological concept of race here characterized. There is something in nature to be described; other biological concepts do not well describe it; the concept of intraspecific natural division does; given historic usage, this concept can reasonably be called “race”; thus race is ‘real’ in the ordinary sense. Theoretically, reality need not have been this way. Race need not have been; and it was not always thought to have. The Linnaean perspective could have been correct; all members of a species could have been identical by descent in nature and varied due to the direct effects of the environment. In this case, there would be no races. However, it was recognized that this perspective was incorrect. The reality of intraspecific hereditary variation and, more specifically, race was realized. "

I don't understand why you feel that the race concept needs to explain something more than this. If you feel that it was always historically thought of otherwise, show this. If you think that another term better describes what I deem to be the race concept, let me know what it is.

Every time a euphemism is created, such as "biogeographic group", some race deconstructionists come along and complain that it is just a euphemism for a concept which they do not like.

Silverstein: " Another reason for the persistence of race and genetics in biomedical research is much more subtle. Certain diseases cluster in populations, such as Tay-Sachs, which is most common in people with an Ashkenazi Jewish background. In such cases, some researchers say we should turn our attention away from race and toward ancestry. If it is true that there are differences in disease risk between human groups, then what we need is a more clever way to dice up humanity. “It has nothing to do with race, it has more to do with ancestry,” explained Rick Kittles, the director of the Center for Population Genetics at the University of Arizona and co-founder of African Ancestry, Inc. “We talk about ancestry, we talk about shared genetic backgrounds. That is a better proxy for biology than race. If someone says they’re of Ashkenazi Jewish ancestry, and they have a family history of Tay-Sachs, that’s not because of a race. That’s because of shared ancestry...But this only takes us in a circle. Even when researchers study ancestry, it is often just race in a phony moustache and glasses....Duana Fullwiley, an anthropologist at Stanford, took an even closer look at how AIMs were dreamed up and used in the laboratories of some prominent researchers—Mark Shriver at Penn State and Esteban González Burchard atUCSF. What she found is that this new system is no better than a find-and-replace of “race” with “ancestry.” In one striking example, she unearthed a patent application that straight-up defines biogeographical ancestry as simply “the heritable component of race.” In her 2008 article, “The Biologistical Construction of Race,” Fullwiley concludes that “the very continents and peoples chosen for this product were selected due to their perceived proximity to what we in North America imagine race to be.”

See also Condit (2007).

At least they understand the concept.

We already have "population" as a unit/tool of study which captures low-moderate levels of biological variation - there is no need to re-define race, or invent a new race concept.

There seem to be quite a few points of disagreement. In these situations, I find that it is best to deal with one issue at a time. Doing so allows for the possibility of coming to either an agreement or a modus vivendi. Let us first address the one mentioned above.

"Population" is both a term and polyseme (a set of related concepts).

The term is ambiguous. See my table 2.2. It frequently describes
spatial units . By this understanding, all New Yorkers, for example, form a "population".
They don't all form a race. The term population also is a synonym for demes.

To specify races, or natural divisions, one would have to qualify the term e.g., ""genealogically arranged" populations". If you want we could call "races" this, but my point would still stand that this is what "race" is meant to mean by proponents of the concept. That said, I have epistemic problems with using the term "population" since it does imply spatial groupings. Natural divisions can be these, but they need not be and, as said, populations need not be such divisions (e..g, all New Yorkers).

For sake of discussion, let us adopt the neutral phrase "natural division" -- or if you don't like "natural", then ""genealogically arranged" divisions". I agree that the term "population" is, at times, used as a synonym for this. I don't have a problem with this. But you do have a problem with me using "race" as a synonym. The argument ultimately is that the term "race" really meant something much different.

I discussed this semantic issue at length. And I also showed that what has been meant by race corresponds with "genealogically arranged divisions". So it is reasonable to call these entities races. Why specifically do you disagree?

Before answering read, in order, III-A, then II-C, I-F, and II-A.

Yea, I defined a population by geographical criteria, but this isn't strictly so. Relethford's definition is more accurate:

"The population in this context is usually defined as the local unit within which most mating takes place. For many organisms including humans, distinct geographic units are often used to delineate population - for example different towns or villages"...But you can find examples of non-geographical barriers: religion, cultural (language) etc. Relethford does discuss these in humans. In non-humans two populations might also inhabit the same area, but not mate much because of behavioural differences.

The main point of the original race concept was to explain why transplanted organisms retained their region of origin characters -- for example, why Africans in Europe and the Americas bore black children -- that is, to explain "constant varieties". Black individuals born in Europe were said to be of the Ethiopian/Negro race = lineage, regardless of their breeding habits (deme) or spatial population. So "population" does not seem really to get at what is meant. In the wild, populations, demes, and (what I call) races correspond, since you typically don't have migrations of the magnitude that humans have experienced in the last several hundred years. So the distinction is often not made. Nonetheless, when not made, it's tacitly recognized. This is why, when subspecies are relocated to zoos around the world and at times cross-bred their (the parental generation) trinomen doesn't change.

Just as in the 1700s the concept -- whatever we wish to call it e.g., biogeographic ancestry group -- is important now. It describes a phenomenon out there and it helps us make sense of the world. I think the area of discussion can only be:

(a) how do we precisely define the concept ?
(b) do various once called racial classifications correspond with it?
(c) is it reasonable to call this concept "race"

However I think you are getting into nested hierarchy, for example Basques, English, Poles falling into "European" and so on, so these are continental divisions. This though doesn't follow for the reasons outlined below:

I discuss why race is compatible with nested hierarchies -- why one could speak of a European race and a Caucasoid one.

"Zones of discontinuity in human gene frequency distributions are present, but the local gradients are so small that they can be identified only by simultaneously studying many loci using complex statistical techniques. In addition, such regions of relatively sharp genetic change do not surround large clusters of populations, on a continental or nearly continental scale. On the contrary, they occur irregularly, within continents and even within single countries.

I don't understand the argument. As I noted, races can be cut from a genomic continuum -- even formally recognized ones. In fact, continuity -- blending together -- was traditionally used as evidence that groups were (intraspecifc) races and not species. Blumenbach, Prichard, Darwin, etc. made this point. I discussed this in the Clines section. But also elsewhere.

Also, I dug up the first subspecies definition:

Ehrhard (1784) noted:

"[Halbarten, Scheinarten, Subspecies] are, in a word, Varietates constantes, or an intermediate between species and Spielarten. They are separated from species in that they differ from one another in small particulars of little importance; and they differ from Spielarten in that they reproduce themselves unchangingly by seed and always beget their like." [Emphasis added]

This corresponds with Buffon's races, except that they were treated as taxa. Notice the highlighted part.

I will make public the list of reviewer requests I have sent out. I am primarily emailing researchers who have written about the biological concept.

Adam Hochman -- pending (sent 4/16)

Michael O. Hardimon -- pending (sent 4/14)

Jeremy Pierce -- No reply (sent 4/08)

Michael Levin -- Accepted, then no reply after (sent 3/13)

Michael Woodley -- Replied, noted he liked it, but said to publish elsewhere (sent 3/13)

Neven Sesardic -- Replied, busy (3/11)

Adam Hochman kindly notified me that he had other commitments (received 4/18)

Because biological classification is based on usefulness. This is measured by how much variation it captures, and how accurately:

"It is critical to note that genetic differentiation alone is insufficient to define a subspecies or race under either of these definitions of race. Both definitions require that genetic differentiation exists across sharp boundaries and not as gradual changes, with the boundaries reflecting the historical splits. These sharp boundaries are typically geographic, but not always. For example, even non-genetic behavioural differences, such as learned song dialects in birds or linguistic boundaries in humans, can serve as the basis for a sharp genetic boundary when these non-genetic traits are associated with evolutionary history." (Templeton, 2013)

Did you read the paper in full? I explain the problem with Templeton's argument in section I-G and V-B and . Not all race =/ taxa subspecies. By the way, I added some material in II-B to give historical context for those arguments made.

"Another level of confusion has resulted from the use of the term “race” to describe both taxa subspecies and intraspecific lineages not formally recognized. The term “subspezies” was first employed and defined by the Swiss botanist Jakob Ehrhart. Ehrhard used the term to describe “constant varieties”, the same entities which Buffon (1779) had called “races”. In 1784, Ehrhard noted:

[Halbarten, Scheinarten, Subspecies] are, in a word, Varietates constantes, or an intermediate between species and Spielarten. They are separated from species in that they differ from one another in small particulars of little importance; and they differ from Spielarten in that they reproduce themselves unchangingly by seed and always beget their like. (Cited in Chater et al. (1966).)

As with Buffon’s races, Ehrhard’s subspecies filled the gap between inconstant varieties and species. They were varieties whose characters were with constancy transmitted genealogically. Notably, in contrast to how Buffon, Kant, and Blumenbach dealt with their intraspecific races, Ehrhard consistently assigned trinomina to his subspecies. In 1781, German entomologist and botanist Eugen Esper published a dissertation in which “subspecies” was similarly equated with “essential varieties” and contrasted with both “accidental varieties” and species.

The relation between race and subspecies did not go unnoticed. Thus, Rorn (1810) equated subspecies with both races and “permanent varieties” (Fuchs, 1958). Over the course of the 19th century, “subspecies” increasingly came to be used to refer to a taxonomic rank under species. For example, when, in 1844, Hermann Schlegel created the concept of conspecies, he included an intraspecific rank designated as “subspecies” or “local races” (Johnson, 2012). As noted by Haffer (2003), Ornithologist Christian Brehm also placed “subspecies” in a hierarchical system. In the early 20th century, “subspecies” was official recognized by the International Commission on Zoological Nomenclature as a taxonomic rank or category. Initially, there were no even informal conventions for the recognition of taxonomic category subspecies. Over time, informal conventions were developed and were tightened up, leaving us with the subspecies we have today, which represent major and “significant” divisions in a species. In zoology, “race” did not come to officially describe a taxonomic category. This was partly owing to the term’s legacy of being dually used to refer to both specific and intraspecific lineages. While, in the 19th and 20th century, “geographic race” was often used as a synonym for taxa subspecies, it was generally recognized that taxa subspecies (except in the case of polytypic subspecies) referred to races which were thought to be deserving of formal taxonomic recognition. Thus, for example, Hubbs (1943) noted: “Unlike races, subspecies are animal kinds which are sufficiently clear-cut as to be thought worthy of a place in the nomenclatorial system”."

Not only are races not necessarily taxa subspecies, which is what Templeton discusses -- moreover (evolutionary taxonomic) taxa subspecies can be cut from a continuum.

See for example, section II-E.

"But there is a substantive issue that we have not touched upon immediately above. When the “clines, not races” argument is not altogether conceptually confused—when it is only semantically so—it raises an issue that we must address. Sometimes natural divisions are such that they form a smooth genetic population continuum, across which character clines would tend to run in the same way. (This is not the case, though, for human continental divisions (Weiss and Fullerton, 2005; Rosenberg et al., 2005).) In zoology, these are simply known as population continua and are distinguished from population isolates. If we take “cline” to mean population continuum, then we might rephrase the American Anthropological Association’s question as: “Races or population continuums?” But this begs the question: “Races: not population continuums?” As defined above, and as consistent with zoological practice, races can exist in and be cut out of a population continuum. The existence of a population continuum is not even inconsistent with the formal zoological recognition of biological races (Mayr and Ashlock, 1991). As Albrecht et al. (2003) note:

Population structure refers to the geographic arrangement of local populations across the species' range. Population structure can be described in terms of three phenomena: the population continuum, geographic isolates, and zones of secondary intergradation (hybrid zones) (e.g., Mayr and Ashlock, 1991). The population continuum is that part of the species' range where there is continuity of contact among local populations, some of which may be recognized as subspecies if sufficiently differentiated. [Emphasis added.]"

The distinction I am making here is well grounded. For example, in section 4, table 4.1, more Polish anthropologists supported the idea of human races than human taxa subspecies see: Kaszycka & Strzałko (2003)

This point should have been very clear. Try searching for "continuum" or "continua" and read the surrounding passages.

Also, I noted, "(intraspecific) races" historically were often understood as continuous, this is what distinguished them from species. This is often still the case. See footnote 23.

Clearly if there are distinguishable and non-vague boundaries: genetic variation can be captured more accurately.

I discussed this. Section II-F and IV-E. If there is a continuum, natural divisions can not be objectively picked out.

Steve Sailer criticizes Diamond (1994) by stating he ignores geographical ancestry when he wrote Nigerians can be grouped with Swedes, and that racial classification is arbitrary. What Sailer misses is biological variation is only abrupt within continents, not between them. So what Diamond is stating is actually true, and note that he is using terms like Nigerians and Swedes. He does not deny those population exist.

The criticism is that Diamond's races don't match with historic understanding of race as lineage. They are molecular polymorphs -- and from the start "race" has been defined in contrast to these.


But do we agree about "populations" -- or at least agree to disagree?

Obviously, I didn't make some of my point clear enough.

If you think that there are issues that were discussed but not clearly so, let me know and I might add text boxes to summarize the points. I'm not a particularly good writer, so some points don't come off well.