I edited my reply, in line with the editor's request, so to come across less acerbic.

Each time I look up one of your old sources - they say the opposite what you say and confirm what I posted. Here's what I found for Kant:

Immanuel Kant "Of the Different Human Races" (1777):
http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic97823.files/I_/Sept_27/KANT.pdf

Things to note:

1. Kant clearly states races must show significance (distinctiveness, relative homogeneity etc) in their characteristic heritable features, otherwise they do not justify a "special division"/classification:

"The people of this stock would always be recognizable and might even be called a race, if their characteristic feature does not seem too insignificant and so difficult to describe that we are unable to use it to establish a special division." (emphasis added)

I discussed Kant at length and said: "As discussed in section III, when it came to
identifying races, Kant seemed not to have considered the possibility of what Darwin later called “correlated variation.” Since he conceptualized races in contrast to polymorphs and other inconstant varieties and since he seemed not to have recognized the principle of correlated variation, it was only logical for him to look for uniformly shared and inevitably inherited characters. Whatever the case, Kant did not give us races in the contemporaneous sense of divisions identified using ancestrally informative correlated variation. For that, Blumenbach had to read Kant’s race concept through his phenetic-based understanding." [I should clarify that Kant's formulation did not (seem to) require within race uniformity in the sense of all members of race A having a height of 6'2" and all members of race B having a height of 5'2". Rather it required a non-overlap between races e.g., all members of race A being taller than all of race B. This can be satisfied by having large enough differences in quantitative traits.]

In section III, I then state: "As for strict character essentialism, as noted in section II, Kant’s formulation would probably best qualify. We quote from his paper, Determination of the Concept of a Human Race (1785)...Thus, his character essentialism was not inherently biologically implausible. To get a situation where one could identify lines of descent this way, one would just need several traits which well tracked lineage and for which the between group variance was high, that is, for which the distributions of the traits did not overlap (outside of the zones of intergradation). The problem with regards to human races is, of course, that there are a dearth of such traits. Some molecular characters such as SNP rs3827760 allele G of the EDAR gene, which conditions Mongoloid typical phenotype (for example, thick hair and shovel shape upper incisors) runs high in East Asian populations and low in many others. But using such characters singularly would end up misclassifying many individuals with respect to how they would be if classified according to overall genetic similarity. It is now clear that individual traits do not make for good differentia. But this is not a new discovery. It was recognized by Buffon, Blumenbach, Darwin, and the many others who argued that one should simultaneously take into account similarity in numerous traits. We imagine that Kant would have had no problem with using character clusters if he understood the technique. Thus, we do not see Kant’s concept as principally or foundationally character essentialist. It was just contingently so; he did not grasp the possibility of cluster classes."

I hardly dodged the key issue. As for you, you might be confusing matters. Kant did not require significant -- in the sense of extensive -- differences, nor did he argue that races were homogenous, indeed he emphasized the manifold of heritable individual variation in his third paper. Rather, he argued that one needed, to make a genealogy-based class division, some trait which uniformly differed between groups. As I noted, the concept of a cluster class did not occur to him. If it did, he would have realized that single uniform trait differences were not necessary. Now, that said, his formulation was not biologically outlandish. After all, proponents of the popular diagnostic phylogenetic species concept presently require the same for the diagnosis of different species. His formulation was just unnecessarily restrictive given his expressed aims.

Instead, your book quotes Dobzhansky (1946) that there is virtually no threshold for race classification as long as there is a "minimum magnitude" of genetic frequency (<0.1%), e.g. between adjacent villages. This "minimum magnitude" was certainly not what Kant had in mind - he ignored such trivial variation because it has no utility.

The quote from Dobzhansky (1946) is:

"[One may perhaps question the desirability of applying the term "racial differences" to distinctions as small as those that can be found between populations of neighboring villages and as large as those between populations of different continents. Might one modify the definition of race by specifying that differences in genes frequencies be above a certain minimum magnitude? Such a modification is undesirable for two reasons.] First, since all magnitudes of difference are found among populations, any specified minimum can be only arbitrary. Second, it is most important to realize that the differences between the ‘major’ human races are fundamentally of the same nature as the relatively minute differences between the inhabitants of adjacent towns or villages. There is no "true" subspecific level. And arguably, as noted by Darwin, there is also no true distinction between specific variation and subspecific variation as the two form a genetic continuum; even when we define a species as a genetically reproductively isolated population, the intrinsic isolation is more accidental than substantial."

Dobzhansky's "racial differences" and "gene frequencies" refer to average differentiation, for example as indexed by Wright's F-statistic. The average difference in "gene frequencies" between groups delineated by a single uniform trait -- like color -- would, of course, be slight. Thus there is no inconsistency between Dobzhansky's lack of requirement of large racial differences and Kant's requirement of a uniform difference. There is an inconsistency between Kant's character essentialist class formulation and the cluster class ones, but I discussed that in detail.

Despite arguing any inter-population variation is racial, you cannot demonstrate this with Kant, Buffon, Blumenbach, or Darwin (I have repeatedly shown: these 18th-19th century scientists set a non-negligible threshold for race, i.e. Hochman's "strong" racial population naturalism). By setting a negligible "minimum magnitude" (where even adjacent villages could qualify as races), Dobzhansky was re-defining race, and you are using his obsolete argument. Dobzhansky was criticized for this decades ago (see for example Montagu, 1962).

Naturally, I discussed this issue in my paper. The short version is: Early race concepts, which divided humans by genealogy/lineage, did not extend all the way down to e.g., small ethnic groups. But now we know that one can make genealogy based divisions often at the level of these. So now one faces a choice: one can set an arbitrary differentiation criteria and recognize only some genealogy based divisions as races or one could recognize all such divisions as races -- or, better, one can distinguish between a general inclusive concept and narrow concepts...The long version is: "Now, to be fair, some used the race concept to describe only certain levels of what we would call racial differentiation. As said, Blumenbach, if ambiguously, distinguished between races and nations. Similarly, Buffon considered as “races” only groups which exhibited constant enough differences (Doron, 2011); less distinct groups were often classified as nations. Thus, many of Dobzhansky’s (1946) “races” would correspond with Buffon’s “nations"..." [Read the whole section.]

Kant thought that races were to a high degree homogenous, at least for certain attributes or traits. In fact for inherited behaviour and intelligence, he maintained there was no variation <whatsoever> (!) within the races.

As detailed, Kant adopted a character essentialist position, which he expressed most fully in his second paper ("Determination of the Concept of a Human Race" (attached)). In that, he stated that skin color -- which he notes is often seen as insignificant -- was the only inevitably inherited -- and thus race delineating -- character that he had clear evidence of. (His position shifted some between papers; in the third, he suggests other possibilities e.g., skeletal structure; and in the first, his positions reads more like Buffon's.) In that second paper, he discussed individual and family differences, including ones in propensity for insanity (which would be behavioral, no?). In "On the use of teleological principles in philosophy" he elaborates more on why he thinks that there is so much non-racial heritable variation in the species. (By the way, can you cite the passage about "inherited behaviour and intelligence" that you had in mind?)

Anyways, Kant's construction supports my position in that:
(a) races were natural divisions
(b) natural divisions were genealogical ones
(c) (base) races were by definition intraspecific lines of descent that differentiated from a common origin and that owing to reproductive isolation maintained these differences
(d) the physiological basis of the differences was conceived in a genetic-like fashion (dispositions in the common lineal stem) as opposed to a Buffonian epigenetic or a Darwinian lamarckian one.
(e) race differences needed not be extensive (see discussion below)
(f) there was a heap load of heritable individual variation (see discussion below)
(g) race differences were adaptive (see discussion below)

Kant's formulation is problematic in that:
(h) it was character essentialist

Regarding phenotypic variation, Kant describes his Mongol race as uniformly black haired, and having the same facial bone structure such as "flat faces". He seemed to recognise little to no variation in each race (one of the few variations in his white race he describes is hair colour). His descriptions show he thought races were primarily homogenous.

I suppose it's possible that he changed his mind by the second paper. I would tend to think, rather, that you might be reading too much into "uniformly black hair" etc. Whatever the case, I don't see how from the first paper you could get "little to no [overall] variation" since he discusses heritable varieties. In the third paper (attached), he notes: "The variety among human beings from the very same race is in all probability just as purposefully secured in the original lineal stem stock in the same way in order to establish the greatest manifold diversity for the sake of infinitely different purposes, as is the difference among races in order to establish the usefulness for fewer, but more essential, purposes [my note: i.e., climatic adaptation].and to develop them in successor generations." So tons of heritable variation within races, but a few adaptive ones between!

Kant's racial classification is typological. His emphasis is that variation found between his races - is the result of mixture. While he does discuss an alternative (climatic adaptation, but in pre-Darwinian terms), he only allows this for a small number of traits.

Please read over his two other papers (attached). He is clear that his base races (Whites, Hindus, etc.) diverged from a common stock and that those base races, when admixed, form half races.

[quote='Krom' pid='3559' dateline='1440808046']

Anyways, did you have any substantive critiques? I thought that we were going to discuss the issue of within race variance after you conceded my other points.

This was a curious claim on your part:

He re-defines race as a breeding population. For example, he told me he thinks a tribe in the jungle, or villagers are a race; he also claimed he didn't see the problem with there being 1,000,000+ human races on earth... they are re-defining race as a panmictic population or deme (bizarrely though they claim this is not a re-definition and Fuerst now argues "races" originally meant jungle tribes, or local populations like a group of villagers....And the funny thing is that one minute Fuerst is defending a trivial re-definition of race as a local population like a jungle tribe, next minute he jumps to talking about racial differences in intelligence between "Negroids" and "Whites" and changes his definition of race to include large continental groupings of peoples.

I stated repeatedly that races were not demes, but were rather natural divisions. Demes are defined in terms of the probability of descendant sharing, while races are defined in terms of ancestor sharing. Regarding how low one can go, I simply followed Adam Hochman's logic: as there is nothing intrinsically different between major races and micro-races, both describing genealogy-based division, a general concept of race should include micro-races. Is that a redefinition of race? If it makes you feel better we can pretend so, though it's easy to find early conceptions of "micro races", for example Duchesne's (1766) Versailles strawberry race which he witnessed the birth of, or some of Buffon's races of dogs.

Your distinction between Darwin and Kant doesn't make any sense since Darwin (1871) also maintained there were profound (e.g. large, significant, worthy of attention) human racial differences:

Your propensity for misunderstanding passages, issues, and context is quite striking. Firstly, and most importantly, you fail to grasp the distinction between perceptions of specific race differences and requirements of race concepts. This seems to be related to a general inability to grasp the distinction between race concepts and racial classifications. Now, Michael Hardimon has elaborated on this point, so I don't feel that I need to. Also, we have gone over it so many times, that I should not have to repeat the point. But I will: there is no inconsistency between saying that such and such races have very large differences (some do -- for example the major races of Ostriches) and saying that races do not need to have large differences. Let me quote what I said prior:

Now to be clear, since you seem to not be the most philosophically inclined individual, the claim, for your argument to work, must be that the concept of race, not merely the understanding of specific races, was one of deeply discontinuous divisions. Michael Hardimon has well clarified this distinction between definitions or concepts of race and perceptions of specific classifications. To give a concrete example, Coon's major races were (prior to the proposed time of admixture) deeply discontinuous, since he adopted a multiregional model. However, since he allowed for numerous "local races" which were not deeply discontinuous, one can not say that his concept of race entailed deep discontinuity. Given the aforesaid, as counter evidence to your claim, I need only provide the following types of evidence: (1) claims made during the said time that races as such (that is, definitionally) did not entail deep discontinuity, (2) discussions of races which the authors acknowledge were NOT deeply discontinuous, or (3) discussions which imply (1) or (2).

I am tempted to rebut your specific claims now -- but I see little long term utility in doing so if we can not agree on this simple point, which is a purely logical one. Do you agree that when an author claims that there are "large" differences between such and such races this does not entail that her concept of race necessitates such differences? Yes or no?

After you agree, I will explain the problems with your examples. As a teaser, I will note a few point about Darwin's claim. First Darwin noted:

Although the existing races of man differ in many respects, as in colour, hair, shape of skull, proportions of the body, etc., yet if their whole organization be taken into consideration they are found to resemble each other closely in a multitude of points. ... The same remark holds good with equal or greater force with respect to the numerous points of mental similarity between the most distinct races of man. The American aborigines, Negroes and Europeans differ as much from each other in mind as any three races that can be named; yet I was incessantly struck, whilst living with the Fuegians on board the “Beagle,” with the many little traits of character, shewing how similar their minds were to ours; and so it was with a full-blooded negro with whom I happened once to be intimate.

He did, as you said, claim that there were large mental differences between major human races. As reference he cited, in one of his books, his nephew Galton who conveniently provided a quantitative estimate in "Hereditary Genius". Therein, Galton noted:

Secondly, the negro race is by no means wholly deficient in men capable of becoming good factors, thriving merchants, and otherwise considerably raised above the average of whites—that is to say, it can not unfrequently supply men corresponding to our class C, or even D..In short, classes E and F of the negro may roughly be considered as the equivalent of our C and D—a result which again points to the conclusion, that the average intellectual standard of the negro race is some two grades below our own.

See the attached pick. Galton estimated a difference of two grades which comes out to 1.39 standard deviations or 21 IQ points (Jensen, 1974). Now consider three facts:

(a) For a normally distributed trait the average difference between random individuals within a population is 2SD/sqrt(pi) = 1.13SD or about 17 IQ points. So, the discussed race differences were thought to not be much larger than the average inter-individual differences. They are nonetheless "large" by conventional standards. (Granted, I am not sure how well Darwin grasped the math -- but Galton surely did, as he developed it.)

(b) It so happen that Africans in African have an average measured cognitive ability quotient of around 75 or 1.67 SD below the UK mean. So the perception of the magnitude of differences was not off. Did Darwin specify what percent was owing to genes? I doubt it, because he didn't have a clear concept of genotype versus phenotype.

(c) This difference comes out to a 33% between group variance (in the sense of eta squared), so more variance would be within than between groups.

Generally, his perception was quite in line with reality, no?

Now, as for the claim that the differences between major humans races was of a magnitude similar to that between many species this was correct -- given how species were often classified in the 18th and 19th century. All sorts of groups which we would now call races or "genetic populations" were classed as species because the standard Linnean criteria for species was simply the intergenerational transmission of form when reared in novel environments. I discussed this point, for example:

As such, in this Linnaean framework, there was little place for what would later be understood as race. And since there was little, and since certain human geographic groups exhibited relatively constant (across environments) and quite conspicuous differences, it was concluded by some (polygenists) that these regional groups represented different species of man. This tendency to deem as species what we would now call races was not limited to zoology and anthropology; it was fully realized in botany (Stamos, 2012; Ratcliff, 2007). The situation, as noted by Stamos (2012), led Jean Baptiste de Lamarck to complain that “nearly all present day Botanists are multiplying species, at the expense of their variety to infinity.” Polygenists were merely treating humans as many botanists treated their objects of study.

It was only in the 20th century -- largely by adopting the criterion of intrinsic reproductive isolation and the biological species concept, which necessitates great isolation (I think a couple of million years on average) -- that species became the deeply different groups which we think of*. Likewise subspecies transformed from Ehrhart's (1784) groups with minor genealogically transmitted differences to the major divisions of a species worth taxonomic recognition**.

*Except in the case of diagnostic phylogenetic species -- the authors of that concept note that some human races probably did recently constitute species. Quote:

Given the vast extent of interbreeding among current human populations, it is unlikely (although not impossible) that any geographically restricted sample of humans is diagnosable [as separate species] today... [P]rior to the advent of intercontinental travel in the past few hundred years, it does appear probable that character distributions would have suggested more than one species of human on the planet...however...the obvious contemporary pattern of increasing introgression among previously allopatric human populations suggests that we are or soon will become on global polymorphic species[.] (Wheeler and Platnick, 2000)

**The subspecies for several non-BSC species concepts do not need to be as differentiated.

But before I deconstruct your other points, answer this question: Do you agree that when an author claims that there are "large" differences between such and such races this does not entail that her concept of race necessitates such differences? Yes or no?

The vast majority of scientists (who as I noted were all proponents of race at the time, this is why your position is almost comical) rejected this view. It was seen as a re-definition of race, and as being absurd.

I said: Before I deconstruct your other points, answer this question: Do you agree that when an author claims that there are "large" differences between such and such races this does not entail that her concept of race necessitates such differences? Yes or no?

Instead of answering this simple question, you changed the focus -- no longer are we discussing 18th and 19th century views but now mid 20th century ones.

Look we have:

How were races viewed:
from 1751-1800 by natural historians/botanists?
from 1801-1850 by natural historians/botanists?
from 1851-1900? by anthropologists/biologists/botanists?
from 1901-1950? by anthropologists/population geneticists/zoologists/ conservation biologists/botanists?
from 1951-2000? by physical anthropologists/population geneticists/zoologists/ conservation biologists/ botanists?
by pre-evolutionists?
by Darwinists?
by Mendelian-Mutationalists?
by Modern Synthesists?

As I pointed out (in my paper) a number of people do require non-trivial differences for races. But others do not. Following Kevin de Queiroz I try to construct a general concept. de Queiroz does this for species, which has the same sort of problem, some defining them as e.g., intrinsically isolated groups, some not.

Now, for a general concept which includes local divisions, I only have to show that a non-trivial number of people accepted the existence of micro(geographical) or local races, which is easy to do, especially since my concept is not human specific. I can show that this is the case now (google search '"local race" genetic' ~ 1000 hits; Ngram search "microgeographic races") and that it was often the case in the pre-1900s (Ngram search "local race" or "minor races"). Now personally, the issue is not important to me, for my own research purposes, since I am interested in major races such as East Asians and Europeans. Despite this, there is a logical and a historical point, which I can not ignore.

Now, what is ridiculous is your argument, which is: (1) Hey everyone pre-Dobzhansky used the term "race" to refer to groups which "significantly" differed. (2) But now we know that no human groups "significantly" differ, so there are no human races. Where not only is premise (1) obviously false, but the argument is invalid as you equivocate in regards to the meaning of "significant". At very best your argument could establish that e.g., Hartl and Clark's (1997) Yanomami tribes would not constitute races in the pre-Dobzhansky sense. But this is of no loss for me -- except in terms of conceptual simplicity.

Now, answer my question above and then I will address the specific claims.

But let me set up and ask another while I am at it. My position, which distinguishes between general and narrow concepts, is consistent with the view that some to many defined races as groups which "significantly" differed. I simply call that a narrow definition a la de Queriroz. As such, you can not falsify my claim by pointing to people who understood races to only be significantly different groups -- you can only by showing that few to none recognized as races groups which differed in "minor" ways. Right? Your position, on the other hand, which makes no general/narrow distinction is inconsistent with the view that some to many understood races such to include groups which differed in "minor" ways. To falsify that, I only need to point to people who understood races such to include these groups. Right? Now, of course, when I point to anyone post Dobzhansky you claim that I am dealing with a revised concept. But surely you can't use this revisionist counter for people between 1750 and the early 1900s. So would you agree that I can rendered untenable your position simply by marshalling a list of pre Dobzhansky people who recognized as races groups which differed in a minor ways?

Please reply to my questions first. As I noted, I like to deal with one critique at a time.

As for Wolpoff (2013), you have to consider what he means by "racial" (one of my points was that there are many narrow concepts):

Milford Wolpoff (2009):

In the earlier literature race was used synonymously with subspecies, and this is still largely the case in the biological literature. A taxonomic division [of variation] equates race with the concept of a subspecies, a division of a species into distinct and distinguishable types... The dismissal of human races as an organizing structure for human biology was for many reasons, including political reasons, but there is a firm biological basis for it in the distribution of genetic variation (Templeton, 1998), that to some extent is reflected in the distribution of anatomical variation... Extant human anatomical variation does not attain the subspecies level; populations are neither different enough, nor separated enough, for a subspecies interpretation of their variation to be valid. The ratio of within group to between group variance is very high in humans. There is no treeness for human groups

Would you honestly argue that this wasn't revisionist? (Please answer.) That early race concepts proposed treeness in Templeton's sense of having little admixture, great isolation, and significant discontinuities (Didn't we discuss this?) or that early concepts required high between group genetic variation -- when the concept of "gene" was not developed until the late 19th to early 20th century. Or that race was always identified with subspecies, when the race concept preceded that latter and given that authors often drew the distinction between subspecies in the taxonomic sense and race. Or that early subspecies concepts required the types of differences now seen as sufficiently taxonomically significant -- actually there are no formal criteria; and the only generally accepted rule of thumb is the 75% one, by which major human races qualify as taxa subspecies --for BSC subspecies recognition.

It's funny that you accuse me of using a revised concept and cite as evidence one that clearly is on numerous easily demonstrable grounds.

0

So what instead do you propose? You are forced to elevate Neanderthals etc, to species?

Depends on the species concept. For the BSC, the species criteria is intrinsic reproductive isolation. Neanderthals showed a high degree of this, so they would constitute either BSC semispecies or species (depending on how strictly one understood "intrinsic reproductive isolation". If not, then obviously a race. For the PSC-D, they would clearly constitute separate species.

Notice how I am able to and how I do answer all of your questions, but you none of mine.

Let's go back to 1951, to UNESCO's (revised) Statement on Race. The 1950 statement was criticized because it consulted very few geneticists and physical anthropologists (it was drafted by sociologists and cultural anthropologists). The revised statement however was approved by Gunnar Dahlberg, J. B. S. Haldane, A. E. Mourant, Henri V. Vallois, S. Zuckerman and Julian Huxley, among many others.

Note the following line in the opening paragraph:

"In its anthropological sense, the word 'race' should be reserved for groups of mankind possessing well-developed and primarily heritable physical differences from other groups."

The Statement also clarifies that Icelanders, English etc., are not races, but local (breeding) populations. Why this is significant is that this Statement was drafted and approved by all leading scientists a decade before denial of race had appeared (Livingstone, 1962; Brace, 1964). Both the 1950 and rev. 1951 Statements do not deny human races exist, or dispute "Negroid"/"Mongoloid"/"Caucasoid" (what are described as major stocks) are useful classificatory tools.

Ah, but we can just go back further. After reviewing early 20th century anthropology articles, Caspari (2009) concluded that race was used “to refer to geographic divisions of the human species, but also to smaller categories that could correspond to nationality and even smaller social groups.” Now, if you want, we can wade through the lit and verify. And once you concede this point, you will have to concede that the statement "the word 'race' should be reserved for" was an explicit attempt to revise the concept.

Now, if you want, we can wade through the lit and verify. And once you concede this point, you will have to concede that the statement "the word 'race' should be reserved for" was an explicit attempt to revise the concept.

This might not be the case as it appears that Krom simply misunderstood the 1951 statement and that the statement doesn't support his position. The discussion of Frota-Pessoa's position reads:

"Frota-Pessoa considers that this is not altogether true at the present stage of scientific research: 'It should be interesting to add that, form the genetical point of view, even not 'well-developed' differences suffice for distinguishing races (cf. Dobzhansky)...This addition is good for the sake of emphasizing that major and minor racial groups differ only in degree, but not qualitatively, and also to destroy the apparent contradiction that this sentence presents with the following statement quoted from the second paragraph of item 4: "...but individual members, or small groups, belonging to different races within the same major group are usually not so distinguishable." If only "well-developed" differences were able for distinguishing races, even "small groups belonging to different races" should be distinguishable."

The point made was acute. There is an apparent contradiction, since we are told:

"Broadly speaking, individual belonging to different major groups of mankind are distinguishable by virtue of their physical characters, but individual members, or smaller groups, belonging to different races within the same major groups are usually not so distinguishable."

Either "well-developed" does not mean (very?) "distinguishable", which defeats Krom's main point, or there is a contradiction in the statement, which renders it ambiguous and thus unsupportive of Krom's argument.

Regarding nation, the statement says:

"National, religious, geographical, linguistic and cultural groups do not necessarily coincide with racial groups...Americans are not a race, nor are Frenchman, nor German: nor ipso facto [i.e., by the very fact] is any other national group."

I would, of course, agree. Dobzhansky and Alice Brues made the same point. For example, Afro-Germans are not of the same race as ethnic Germans. More generally, nations, in the political sense, do not necessarily coincide with races (or, for that matter, nations) in the biological sense; modern nation-states, as the statement says, are not ipso facto races; this is because they are too heterogeneous; they contain peoples of numerous races. There were Africans in Britain in the 17th century, Africans in Germany in the early 20th century, Chinese in India in the 19th century, and so on. There is simply no contradiction between the claim that nations in the political sense are not races and the claim that the concept of race applies to difficult to distinguish nation size divisions.

Yes, also if you could show them as local breeding populations (demes) or just spatial populations covering small regions. By "local" or "small" I don't mean Buffon's (or whoever it was) "Tatar race".

1. Regarding races and names: Races can be treated as taxa (divisions formally assigned to a distinct category -- in this case, "subspecies" -- in a hierarchical system of classification), in which case they are given formal names (trinomia). And races can be treated as units of analysis, in which case race represents a non-hierarchical classification, like "(spatial) population", "morph", or "ecotype". It would be impractical to formally name all races of a species at a given time and to list them in catalogues; and doing so would require a multiplying of the number of taxonomic categories (sub-subspecies, sub-sub-subspecies -- some of these were once proposed e.g., natio). This is pretty obvious and it is the standard reason that systematicists give for creating an arbitrary threshold for formal racial recognition. Now, this is what I mean by "it would be impractical to formally name all races". When treating races as units of analysis, it would be inexpedient, since one never analyzes all races at one time. The same applies with respect to the other classifications noted above. I fail to see why you don't recognize the equivalence of the situation. But perhaps you think that races should only be treated as taxa? I discussed this position in length. I noted that races were not originally treated as taxa (see Kant's discussion in his third paper) and they were never all treated so. To sum up, if you wish to argue that race is only a useful classification if all races in a given species at a given time are given names then you must either (a) maintain that races must be taxa or (b) contend that same holds for all other like classifications e.g., "deme", "(spatial) population", "morph", "biotype", "stock", "strain", "cluster", "form", "ecotype", "groups" (i.e., assemblages of closely related taxa), "semispecies", and "super-species". Which will it be? You will have to adopt either an absurd position (b) or a revisionist one (a).

2. Regarding races and levels of analysis, which of the following would you like to maintain were not infrequently recognized as races (in the sense which I mean)?
a. major regional divisions like Buffon's European race
b. lesser regional divisions like Buffon's Tartar race
c. nation-size ethnic divisions like "Japanese" (often called "minor races" or "local races") e.g., "Sarawak has a mixed population, consisting of Malays, Milanows, Chinese, Dyaks, and other minor races too numerous to mention" (De Windt, 1882)
d. largish intra-national divisions like some of the many races of Africa enumerated by Prichard in "Physical Ethnography Of The African Races".
e. Smaller groups like Congolese pygmies or various island and hill races (sometimes called "tribal races") and other well differentiated department or village sized groups e.g., many of Wallace's Malay Archipelago races in "On the varieties of man in the Malay Archipelago".
f. weakly differentiated adjacent department or village sizes groups

As for (f), I am not sure if many of these would (currently) constitute races as I define them, since many would not be linebred=isolated enough. Recall that my races are neither spatial populations nor demes which differ on average, they are divisions for which members are more related to each other than to those of other divisions. Whatever the case, clarify your position so that I may respond.

"A more ecumenical proposal in this spirit would be to say that the word “race” refers to populations, more generally. The trouble is that, in this sense, while there are human populations that are and have been for some time relatively reproductively isolated, it is not at all plausible to claim that any social subgroup in the United States is such a population. In this sense, then, there are human races, because there are human populations, in the geneticists’ sense, but no large social group in America is a race. (The Amish, however, might come out as a race on this view, since they are a relatively reproductively isolated local population.)" (Appiah, 1996)

As I have noted, "population" is an ambiguous term. It can mean either: (a) spatial population, (b) deme, (c) what I call race (natural division), or (d) some ambiguous mix of the previous three. The US and the UK represent two different "populations" in the sense of (a) and (b), but few would say that they represent two separate races. By population, Appiah seems to mean (c) -- surely he doesn't just mean e.g., mendelian populations between which there are some differences since by this there would be many large social "races" e.g., social classes, religious denominations, and linguistic groups. As for his point, I discussed this at the end of my section II. I noted that self identified race/ethnicity (SIRE) groups overlap with biological races. Of course there are separate (c) in the U.S! That is, you can divide the US spatial population into natural division, ones which overlap, to some degree, with SIRE groups -- I provided references in defense of this point. These races would, of course, be somewhat continuous, owing to admixture, but we discussed that issue prior.

"Because the concept “race” can only apply to groups not typically deemed races (Amish, Irish Protestants), and because this concept cannot apply to groups typically deemed races (African Americans, Whites, Asians, Native Americans), a mismatch occurs between the concept and its typical referent. Thus, the concept of race must be eliminated due to its logical incoherence (Mallon 2006, 526, 533)."

It's bizarre that this passes for philosophy, isn't it? (I, of course, criticized some other aspects of the article in my paper; I wasn't unaware of it.) Anyways, his trick works by conflating the concept of SIRE with that of biological race (as c). The "logical incoherence" is simply a mirage produced by his equivocation. Once the distinction is recognized the utility of the biological race (as c) concept becomes apparent. It's curious that he doesn't argue against the concept of e.g., "biogeographic ancestry group" (race) on the same grounds and claim that the vast admixture mapping research program is epistemically confused. Or, for that matter, argue against the sociological concept of race (SIRE) -- by just reversing the argument -- and deduce that e.g., affirmative actions rests on epistemically shaky grounds. Sophist.

"Anyway, three years before Ehrhart, Esper (1781) who first introduced the term "subspecies" made clear they require substantial differences."

Before i'm accused of posting a lie, here's my source:
http://antbase.org/ants/publications/10882/10882_0063.pdf

Full citation: http://sysbio.oxfordjournals.org/content/6/2/53.extract

Krom,

I can, to a degree, tolerate your lack of critical reading skills, but not your slander. If you are going to continue to misrepresent the content of my work here and elsewhere, I can no longer persist with this exchange. If it is pointed out to me that you continue with such misstatements, I will be forced to end this dialogue.

Regarding Ehrhart's subspecies, he explicitly referred to them as "constant varieties":"[Subspecies are] ... often so similar to each other that an inexperienced person has trouble in separating them. They are in a word, Varieties constantes, or an intermediate between species and Spielarten". This is the same type of entity which Buffon and others called "races": "The races in each species of animal are only constant varieties which perpetuate themselves by generation." (Buffon, 1778).

"Variety" originally referred to environmental induced deviations from a species type e.g., Linnaeus's geographic varieties of man (europaeus, afer, asiaticus, americanus). But soon it was realized that certain varieties, including human varieties, were continually transmitting their form independent of the environment, through their seed.

These were originally called "constant varieties", since the characteristic form remained constant, to a degree, across environments. Buffon popularized the term "race" to refer to them and conceptualized them as lineages, phylogenic networks, or lines of descent.

Varieties, constant and inconstant, could refer to both trivial and to relatively extensive, though not essential, difference, for example the magnitudes of differences found between various breeds of dogs, horses, or cattle. As Blyth noted: "The term “variety” ... is vague in the degree of being alike used to denote the slightest individual variation, and the most dissimilar breeds which have originated from one common stock." Of course, "race" and "subspecies" described constant varieties (both wild and domesticated), not inconstant ones. (And yes, unlike "races", constant varieties qua "subspecies" were mostly treated as taxa, thus setting up the modern distinction.)

Now, conceptualizing "constant varieties" as "demes" is odd, since, unlike "constant varieties" (races), "demes" are not delineated in terms of genealogically transmitted traits. And unlike "demes", "constant varieties" (races), were not delineated in terms of descendant sharing. But if you wish to redefine the terms, I suppose that you could. In this case, Krom demes = races between which there are relatively small differences.

Now, you go on to criticize my reading of Esper. You cite a passage which quotes him as saying:

"Subspecies which are generally called varieties, are to be clearly separated from them. That they took their origin from species, is clearly revealed by perfect similarity of the essential parts."

In contrast, I quote him, in section III, as saying:

Esper (1782): "Subspecies (untergattungen, Races) which are generally called varieties, are to be clearly separated from them. That they originated from species is clearly revealed by the perfect similarity of the essential parts... they are equally capable of producing offspring, an ability which varieties are denied."

And he originally wrote:

"Subspecies (untergattungen, Races) quae vulgo annumerantur varietatibus, plane ab his sunt separandae. Originem ex speciebus duxisse, perfectus in iis declarat partium essentialium similitudo. Characteríbus autem pariter sunt distinctae, quamvis minus essentialibus, caussa qua fuere mutatae eadem manente, sive sit externa sive interna. Ad procreandam sobolem eamque ipsis aequalem aptae, differunt hac virtute a varietatibus quibus ea denegata est."

The first point to note is that my translation was little different from the one you provided, which is amazing since, in undergrad, I studied Greek not Latin. The second is that, contrary to what you claim, I did not leave out the part about "perfect similarity". The third is that you completely misread his statement.

Esper is saying that subspecies/races are not the same as inconstant varieties ("plane ab his sunt separandae") because like species, and unlike inconstant varieties, they reproduce their separate type ("Ad procreandam sobolem eamque ipsis aequalem aptae"). But, he notes, they are also not like species, because they originated from species ("Originem ex speciebus duxisse"), similar to how inconstant varieties do ("caussa qua fuere mutatae eadem manente"), which is obvious because they lack essential or species-like differences ("perfectus in iis declarat partium essentialium similitudo"). That is, according to Esper, different subspecies/races, while distinct ("Characteríbus autem pariter sunt distinctae") are essentially the same and thus unlike species.

Now, perhaps you can explain how you get "subspecies require "perfect similarity" in certain traits" from " Originem ex speciebus duxisse, perfectus in iis declarat partium essentialium similitudo". And while you are at it, perhaps you can explain how Esper's statement that subspecies are while different essentially the same fits with your narrative.

By the way, the origin, which I bothered to (attempt to) read is here: http://openpsych.net/forum/attachment.php?aid=634

Oh, you didn't yet answer my question above.

Interestingly if you read this paper, the authors complain that deme should not be a word on its own (because its an add-on, such as phenodeme, topodeme, ecodeme and others). However it was most widely used to mean gamodeme and has stuck as a local breeding population/panmictic unit.
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1469-8137.1981.tb02350.x/pdf

I cited a more recent paper, instead:

Winsor, M. P. (2000). Species, Demes, and the Omega Taxonomy: Gilmour and The New Systematics. Biology and Philosophy, 15(3), 349-3

Ok, but you would agree that my "natural divisions" are not simply "demes between which there are genetic differences", no? (Let's just call these "genogamodemes" for now.) That is, not all natural divisions are genogamodemes, and not all genogamodemes are natural divisions. And you would agree that the same holds for "constant varieties", no? Thus I wrote:

"Generally, demes (or gamodemes) are defined in terms of the probability of sharing descendants, while races are defined in terms of shared ancestry. While the two concepts are related, as demes which are isolated to a sufficient degree for a long enough time become races (a point recognized by early race theorists), the concepts are distinct. Thus, one can not change one's race by changing one's deme (that is, by joining another breeding community). Conversely, by forming a more or less isolated breeding community one can not immediately form a race; and by dissolving the barriers to exogamy that define a deme, one can not make members of a once deme-race, not members of a race. This is a nontrivial conceptual distinction and it is one which stands at the core of the original race concept, one which attempted to explain why transplanted organisms kept their region (and often deme) of origin characteristics and yet were capable of interbreeding with organisms in the destination region (and often deme). "

For example, North and South America form two massive genogamodemes, but surely not two biogeographic ancestry groups or natural divisions. Thus, what I call race -- and what was often called race -- is not redundant with what you call deme.

So that we can move forward, can you either concur or disagree?

The problem you now have is your large divisions of populations (e.g. "Europeans"), are not actual meta-populations but arbitrary spatial populations. The problem with this is they aren't then useful.

You are being evasive. I previously summarized the flow of the argument:
http://openpsych.net/forum/showthread.php?tid=226&pid=3521#pid3521 We should be on point (5).

I articulated a meaningful sense in which races, so defined, were both real and natural. So you changed the issue to one of whether the race concept and/or its application to humans was "useful". I noted that it was useful for me. And I noted that a number of others employ race or race-like concepts. I also pointed out that the "genetic population", "genetic cluster", and "biographic ancestry group" concepts as often formulated -- ones which clearly are seen as being useful by many -- are equivalent to the general race concept which I was discussing. And I noted that a number of race-critics have pointed out the same, arguing... Recognizing that if you granted that e.g., "biographic ancestry" groups are races "in a phony moustache and glasses" (Silverstein, 2015) you would have to concede the "usefulness" argument, you began to double down on your race-revisionist one. According to this, old time races were conceptualized radically different from our new time "biographic ancestry" groups or "genetic populations"...

To establish the radical difference:

1. First you argued that races, as divisions of a species, were traditionally thought of as having platonic essences. I showed that this wasn't the case.
2. Then you argued that races as such were traditionally thought of as lacking individual variation. I showed that this wasn't the case.
3. Then you argued that races as such were traditionally thought of as lacking individual variation "in situ". I again showed that this wasn't the case.
4. Then you argued that races were traditionally thought of as being deeply discontinuous. I again showed that this wasn't the case.
5. Now you wish to argue that the differences between races per se was traditionally thought of as exceeding the differences between organisms within races. I noted that this is a complex issue and that I would like to come to an agreement about (1-4) before moving on to it.

Instead, you are playing (?) dense and feigning (?) that you can not recognize the difference between spatial populations, demes, genogamodemes, and natural division races. If my race concept is not useful, then why is it so often used, just under different names e.g., "biogeographic ancestry groups", "genetic clusters", etc?

I'm not interested in Mikemikev drama, don't discuss it here.

I have more evidence for my claims, this time for Buffon.

Did you just start reading my comments?

Naturally, I discussed this issue in my paper. The short version is: Early race concepts, which divided humans by genealogy/lineage, did not extend all the way down to e.g., small ethnic groups. But now we know that one can make genealogy based divisions often at the level of these. So now one faces a choice: one can set an arbitrary differentiation criteria and recognize only some genealogy based divisions as races or one could recognize all such divisions as races -- or, better, one can distinguish between a general inclusive concept and narrow concepts...The long version is: "Now, to be fair, some used the race concept to describe only certain levels of what we would call racial differentiation. As said, Blumenbach, if ambiguously, distinguished between races and nations. Similarly, Buffon considered as “races” only groups which exhibited constant enough differences (Doron, 2011); less distinct groups were often classified as nations. Thus, many of Dobzhansky’s (1946) “races” would correspond with Buffon’s “nations"..." [Read the whole section.]

http://openpsych.net/forum/showthread.php?tid=226&pid=3560#pid3560

I suppose that one could define a race as a "visibly" recognizable natural division as opposed to a genomically recognizable one. And in defense of the arbitrary requirement for "visible" recognition one could cite historic usage and the relation between the race and the constant variety concept. That would surely answer Hochman-esque critiques -- and one would still retain regional human races. I would tend to call that a "narrow race concept", though, and subsume it under a more general one, which would make room for Hartl and Clark (1997) esque races. What would Buffon have thought about this more general usage? I don't know, but it's consistent with the idea of race as lineage identified, not defined by, by differences.

A race/subspecies is an intergenerational deme or meta-population (group of demes) that shows a high level of genetic differentiation.

So to argue that "Caucasoids", "Mongoloids", and "Negroids" are not races, despite being "bio-geographic ancestry groups", or natural divisions in the Darwinian sense, you have to employ a revised concept of race, race as "(gamo)deme", a concept which you yourself noted only became popular after the late 1930's. But sure, I agree that "Caucasoids", "Mongoloids", and "Negroids" currently are not (i.e., do not perfectly overlap with) races qua (genogamo)demes, I maintain however that:

(a) they are races qua natural divisions
(b) race qua natural division is more true to the original concept (less revised) than race qua (genogamo)deme
(c) definitionally equating race/subspecies with (genogamo)deme conflicts with actual zoological practice. In my paper, I provided a hypothetical:

"For example, in the world, there are only a handful of the northern subspecies of the white rhinoceros (Ceratotherium simum). And there is only one male. Imagine that for conservation purposes they were transported to a southern white rhinoceros preserve. Imagine also that the remaining members of the northern subspecies bred freely with the members of the southern. When precisely would the white rhinoceros cease to have two traditional subspecies? When the last of the northern race died? When no full-blooded northern rhinoceros could be born? Currently, since there are so few of the northern subspecies? It is the sorties paradox applied to natural populations. No attempt to answer these questions will
be made here (though it will be noted that conservationists do speak of the last of a race or subspecies)."

When relocated to the southern white rhinoceros preserve the northern joins that southern deme. Oddly, though, zoologists recognize that the northern is still of a different subspecies lineage. How do you explain this, given your understanding? By the way, in section III, I discussed the natural division concept in relation to some zoological-population ones:

There is potentially discord, though, between some population concepts of race and a natural division one. In zoology, for example, races are at times imprecisely defined as geographic “populations which differ taxonomically from other subdivisions of the species” (Mayr (1940), cited in O’Brien and Mayr (1991)). When this definition is literally read, such groups need not be natural divisions; they could be collections of ancestrally dissimilar subpopulations which happened to coincidentally inhabit a common locale – for example, a zoo space – and which happened to differ on average from other such collections. More precise zoological definitions stipulate that members share “phylogenetically concordant” characters and a “unique natural history” (O’Brien and Mayr, 1991). These qualifications specify that members of one race are relatively more similar to other members of the same race owing to common ancestry. Thus, we are left with something akin to natural divisions. There are, though, two potential areas of disagreement between such conceptions and a natural division one. First, when members of a zoological population-race are said to have “shared a geographic range” this could be taken either descriptively or prescriptively. Insofar as it is taken as the latter, as a membership criterion, we are dealing with a narrow form of a natural division and with a curious type of race, given the genealogy of the concept, one which attempted to explain why relocated organisms retained their region of origin characteristics. As we understand things, races are not defined in terms of geographic relationship; rather, such relationship is an explanation for the breeding patterns which brought them about. Second, in discourses where races are said to be “populations,” as opposed to classes or divisions, the exact degree of genetic similarity that is needed for an individual to qualify as a member of a specific race is often not clarified. We are left with a fuzzy conception which lends itself to a fuzzy set concept reading, one in which the boundaries of races are left indiscrete. Races as populations then potentially represent fuzzy sets, while natural divisions as we primarily understand them represent discrete sets....

I have more evidence for my claims, this time for Buffon.

Answer the question below:
http://openpsych.net/forum/showthread.php?tid=226&pid=3585#pid3585

2. Regarding races and levels of analysis, which of the following would you like to maintain were not infrequently recognized as races (in the sense which I mean)?
a. major regional divisions like Buffon's European race
b. lesser regional divisions like Buffon's Tartar race
c. nation-size ethnic divisions like "Japanese" (often called "minor races" or "local races") e.g., "Sarawak has a mixed population, consisting of Malays, Milanows, Chinese, Dyaks, and other minor races too numerous to mention" (De Windt, 1882)
d. largish intra-national divisions like some of the many races of Africa enumerated by Prichard in "Physical Ethnography Of The African Races".
e. Smaller groups like Congolese pygmies or various island and hill races (sometimes called "tribal races") and other well differentiated department or village sized groups e.g., many of Wallace's Malay Archipelago races in "On the varieties of man in the Malay Archipelago".
f. weakly differentiated adjacent department or village sizes groups

And while doing so, recall this:
http://openpsych.net/forum/showthread.php?tid=226&page=33

As I pointed out (in my paper) a number of people do require non-trivial differences for races. But others do not. Following Kevin de Queiroz I try to construct a general concept. de Queiroz does this for species, which has the same sort of problem, some defining them as e.g., intrinsically isolated groups, some not...Now, for a general concept which includes local divisions, I only have to show that a non-trivial number of people accepted the existence of micro(geographical) or local races, which is easy to do, especially since my concept is not human specific. I can show that this is the case now (google search '"local race" genetic' ~ 1000 hits; Ngram search "microgeographic races") and that it was often the case in the pre-1900s (Ngram search "local race" or "minor races")...My position, which distinguishes between general and narrow concepts, is consistent with the view that some to many defined races as groups which "significantly" differed. I simply call that a narrow definition a la de Queriroz. As such, you can not falsify my claim by pointing to people who understood races to only be significantly different groups -- you can only by showing that few to none recognized as races groups which differed in "minor" ways. Right? Your position, on the other hand, which makes no general/narrow distinction is inconsistent with the view that some to many understood races such to include groups which differed in "minor" ways. To falsify that, I only need to point to people who understood races such to include these groups. Right? Now, of course, when I point to anyone post Dobzhansky you claim that I am dealing with a revised concept. But surely you can't use this revisionist counter for people between 1750 and the early 1900s. So would you agree that I can rendered untenable your position simply by marshalling a list of pre Dobzhansky people who recognized as races groups which differed in a minor ways?

To the question you answered "yes" -- which, seemingly, gives me down to (e).

No, you have to have independent referees/reviewers (usually at least 3) that are qualified in the subject, furthermore they should not show some sort of heavy or clear bias....Kev Macdonald the only referee is not qualified, his background is psychology (not biology, physical anthropology or genetics which Fuerst's paper mostly covers). Macdonald also is heavily biased

The paper cut across so many subjects that there was no one who would have been an expert with respect to the full content. When writing it, I did consult philosophers of race such as Neven Sesardic and J Shiao and I did communicate with race critics such as Alan Templeton and Massimo Pigliucci, for example, respectively, on supposed subspecies Fst criterion and on ecotype concepts. I also consulted others, who would like to stay anonymous. As for reviewers,

Peter Frost is a well published anthropologist, who has written on similar topics. He was particularly qualified to review parts of section II and IV. Davide Piffer's expertise is population genetics; he has published in notable journals such as "Intelligence" and he has conducted novel research regarding some of the esoteric population genetic issues which I discussed. He was particularly qualified to review parts of section IV. Kevin MacDonald has published on evolutionary psychology, specifically on topics such as ethnic nepotism, which I discuss in my section 6. He was specifically picked because I addressed ethnic parochialism with respect to morality and since I discussed some of his own positions, which I presume that he is an expert on.

Of course, none of these reviewers were critical of my meta-position, because there is little to be critical of, given how I tightly constructed the thesis; they were critical of specific points, of course. If you actually read through the paper, you will find that section II.2 (beginning) is the only epistemically problematic part. Beyond that there are simply typos, which is why, despite months of discussion, you have yet to uncover a major problem which I did not address in my paper.

Each time I look up one of your old sources - they say the opposite what you say and confirm what I posted. Here's what I found for Kant:

Immanuel Kant "Of the Different Human Races" (1777):
http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic97823.files/I_/Sept_27/KANT.pdf

Things to note:

1. Kant clearly states races must show significance (distinctiveness, relative homogeneity etc) in their characteristic heritable features, otherwise they do not justify a "special division"/classification:

"The people of this stock would always be recognizable and might even be called a race, if their characteristic feature does not seem too insignificant and so difficult to describe that we are unable to use it to establish a special division." (emphasis added)

How, possibly, does this contradict anything I said? For one, in my article, I quoted this very passage. For another, "does not seem too insignificant" and does not seem "so difficult to describe" implies 'just significant and describable enough to allow one to classify individuals into genealogical based divisions', which entails 'does not need to be very significant or describable'. Now, the question is: if kant knew about molecular based classifications (cluster analysis), what would he think? Would he say: (a) 'well, you can classify, so those would be races also' or would he say (b) 'well, no, by 'race' I mean visibly classifiable, because...' If (b) what would his reason be? I couldn't think of a good one, so I argued that he would go with (a). I notice that you keep conflating issues. Somehow from 'different enough to allow for a visual/metrical classifying' you jump to 'need to have Templeton like 'deep discontinuities''. You could, of course, argue that, based on pre 1940s usage, the term "race" should not apply to classes which can be molecularly but not visually/metrically classified. But this provides no leverage in arguing that races need deep differences. Rather, it provides both an argument to the contrary (they only need to be visible classifiable) and a simple alternative rebuttal to Hochman like critiques.