Evolutionary Game Theory and Electoral Dynamics
It is argued that there is a fundamentally different dynamic
between typical electoral competition as modeled by the Median Voter
Theorem and the recent EU Referendum held in the UK. It is proposed
that the replicator dynamic from
continuous evolutionary game theory can illuminate this. This informal
exposition of the ideas avoids mathematics.
The paper is an attempt to understand why the referendum was so divisive of public opinion and so long lasting.
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Michael,
I read this both in the initial version and this, and didn't change my opinion. It reads like a blogpost, not an academic article. There's no particular research topic, it seems to just be an illustration of that approach to thinking about a topic. Hence, I don't see it as being publication worthy at this point.
I read this both in the initial version and this, and didn't change my opinion. It reads like a blogpost, not an academic article. There's no particular research topic, it seems to just be an illustration of that approach to thinking about a topic. Hence, I don't see it as being publication worthy at this point.
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